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Brandt argued that public policy 
demanded that major corporations 
should not be permitted " to purchase 
only the benefits in an asset purchase 
transaction, while denying its atten-
dant liabilities to the consuming pub-
lic." Id. Nissen countered that the 
asset purchase agreement was a valid 
and fully negotiated contract in which 
the burden of liability for injuries 
caused by defective products had been 
expressly allocated to the predecessor 
corporation. Id. Nissen urged the 
court to adopt the general rule with 
only the four traditional exceptions, 
because the rule balanced the " rights 
of creditors and successor corpora-
tions," as well as "maintain[ed] ad-
equate protection for the interests of 
consumers . . . from fraudulent and 
unjust corporate transactions." Id. at 
568. 
Before reaching its decision, the 
court of appeals considered the doc-
trine of strict liability and its concept 
offault. Id. The court acknowledged 
that public policy concerns for shift-
ing the financial risk of loss to those 
better able to bear it was a policy 
consideration in adopting the doctrine 
into Maryland law. Id. at 569 (citing 
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 
A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)). The 
court, however, emphasized that the 
thrust of strict liability actions was 
that the sellers of products were at 
fault when they put a defective or 
unreasonably dangerous product on 
the market and a user was injured. Id. 
at 569. The court found that a corpo-
rate successor" [was] not a seller," 
and therefore, not involved in " bring-
ing the product and the user together. " 
Id. In addressing the present case, the 
court stated that it would be " unfair to 
require a party to bear the cost of 
unassumed and uncontemplated prod-
ucts liability claims primarily because 
it [was] still in business and [was] 
perceived as a 'deep pocket. ,,, Id. 
The court lastly reviewed the hold-
ings from a minority of states who 
have adopted the continuity of enter-
prise theory. Id. at 571-73. In analyz-
ing these cases, the court failed to find 
a compelling reason to deviate from 
the traditional corporate successor li-
ability rule. Id. at 573. The court 
concluded that the adoption of the 
continuity of enterprise theory would 
be inconsistent with Maryland law, 
because it would require the court to 
abandon its fundamental principle that 
there must be fault to impose tort 
liability. Id. at 574. Thus, the court 
of appeals expressly rejected the con-
tinuity of enterprise theory. Because 
Brandt's claim rested solely upon the 
court's adopting that theory as a fifth 
exception, the court affirmed the trial 
court's decision granting Nissen's 
motion for summary judgment. Id. 
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland for-
mally adopted the general rule ofnon-
liability of successor corporations, to-
gether with its four traditional and 
well-recognized exceptions. The rule 
and the four exceptions were found to 
be sufficient to protect both the inter-
ests of the consumer and business in 
products liability cases. With the 
court's decision, Maryland joined the 
majority of states adhering to a tradi-
tional rule of non-liability of succes-
sor corporations with its four excep-
tions. 
- Linda M. Googins 
Optic Graphics, Inc. v.Agee: MARY-
LAND COURT DEFINES " TRADE 
SECRET" AND DETERMINES 
WHEN SANCTIONS ARE APPRO-
PRIATEFOR BAD F AITII CLAIM 
UNDER MARYLAND UNIFORM 
TRADE SECRET ACT. 
For the first time ever, an appel-
late court has examined the terms of 
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret 
Act of 1989. In Optic Graphics, Inc. 
v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1991), the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland held that Maryland's 
Uniform Trade Secret Act protects a 
broader scope of information as trade 
secrets than the Restatement of Torts. 
The court noted, however, that the 
Restatement should still serve as a 
guide in determining what informa-
tion qualifies as a trade secret. The 
court also upheld the part of Maryl and 's 
Uniform Trade Secret Act providing 
for sanctions against parties who ini-
tiate or maintain a claim in bad faith or 
without reasonable justification, but 
only if the claim was entirely without 
color and imputed egregious behav-
ior. 
Co-defendant Ross Agee worked 
for Optic Graphics ("Optic"), an es-
tablished vinyl looseleaf binder manu-
facturer with a work force of nearly 
375 people and annual revenues of 
$27 million. Agee's responsibilities 
initially included estimating costs re-
lated to printing jobs for which Optic 
intended to bid. Agee's duties re-
quired that he have access to certain 
information which Optic considered 
confidential. As with all of its em-
ployees, the company maintained a 
personnel file on Agee which included 
a confidentiality agreement. 
Agee and his co-defendant, 
Michael Zanella, made efforts over a 
number of years to join resources and 
buy a printing business. In June, 
1989, without Optic's knowledge, 
Agee and Zanella took the opportunity 
to buy a looseleaf bindery business 
and formed what eventually became 
the third and final co-defendant in this 
case, A to Z Looseleaf, Inc. (" A to 
Z"). In order to obtain financing for 
the deal, Agee and Zanella prepared a 
formal business plan including, among 
other things, a marketing strategy. By 
October, 1989, they had secured a 
loan which would lead to the settle-
ment of their new business venture in 
February, 1990. 
Optic first found out about the 
forthcoming A to Z when Agee re-
signed from his position with Optic in 
December, 1989. At this time, A to Z 
had no contracts, assets, customers, 
or raw material orders. On January 
24, 1990, Optic filed suit alleging that 
Agee had misappropriated Optic's 
trade secrets and breached a confiden-
tiality agreement. Specifically, Optic 
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contended that Agee relied on pricing 
and marketing information from his 
estimating job to develop the A to Z 
business plan and, in doing so, 
breached the confidentiality agreement 
by disclosing the information to third 
parties without Optic's consent. The 
law suit effectively stalled Agee's and 
Zanella's efforts to get A to Z into 
operation. 
Once settlement efforts failed, both 
parties prepared for trial. During his 
deposition, Agee questioned the au-
thenticity of his signature on a photo-
copy of the confidentiality agreement. 
Agee's counsel hired a handwriting 
expert who determined that the signa-
ture on the photocopy of the agree-
ment was a forgery. On March 13, 
1990, Agee's counsel informed Optic 
that it had expert testimony attesting 
to the forged signature. Despite the 
validation of the forgery and its fatal 
effect on Optic's claim, Optic refused 
to meet Agee's and Zanella's demand 
for dismissal. 
At the close of trial, the court 
found that, because the pricing and 
marketing information in this case 
was not a trade secret, no misappro-
priation took place. The trial court 
imposed sanctions on Optic to pay 
Agee's court costs and attorney ex-
penses accruing from the time Agee 
made Optic aware of the forgery, and 
Optic appealed. 
The court of special appeals first 
considered whether the pricing and 
marketing information was trade se-
cret material, the parameters of which 
the court had never established under 
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret 
Act(" the Act" ), Md. Com. Law Code 
Ann. § 11-1201 to 1209 (1990). The 
court recognized that, under the Act, 
the information must meet two re-
quirements in order to be protectable 
as a trade secret. Optic GraphiCS, 591 
A.2d at 587. First, the information 
must derive " independent economic 
value" from not becoming generally 
known or ascertainable by those who 
stand to benefit from the information's 
disclosure and use. Id. Second, the 
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party claiming the information as a 
trade secret must have taken" reason-
able efforts" to maintain its secrecy. 
Id. 
The court recognized the rudi-
ments of trade secret law in Maryland. 
Before the Act came into law, Mary-
land courts followed the Restatement 
of Torts section 757 (1939) as the 
authority on whether certain informa-
tion qualified as a trade secret. Optic 
Graphics, 591 A.2d at 585. The 
Restatement lists both a definition for 
trade secret and six factors for deter-
mining if certain information is 
protectable as a trade secret. Id. 
The court compared the require-
ments of both the Restatement and the 
Act and considered that the most dis-
tinct difference between the two au-
thorities involves the use of the infor-
mation in business. Optic Graphics, 
591 A.2d at 585 n.13. The court 
emphasized that, while the Act does 
not require that the information have a 
purpose in business, such a require-
ment is necessary in the Restatement, 
making the scope of the Act much 
broader in coverage. Id. at 585. The 
court, therefore, held that the Act 
encompasses the Restatement of Torts . 
The court emphasized the importance 
of the Restatement as sound guidance 
in establishing meaning of the terms 
within the Act. Optic Graphics, 591 
A.2d at 585. 
While the court of special appeals 
recognized that pricing and marketing 
information can be a trade secret, the 
information involved in Optic Graph-
ics was not a trade secret. The court 
affirmed the trial court's findings that: 
(1) the pricing and marketing informa-
tion contained too many variables that 
reduced its value to Optic's competi-
tors; (2) the information was so easily 
obtainable that it did not constitute a 
trade secret; and (3) A to Z would have 
been so small in comparison to Optic 
that the information would have been 
of no value to the defendants. Id. at 
585-86. 
The court of special appeals then 
interpreted the meaning of section 11-
1204, " Award of Attorney's Fees," in 
the Act providing for the distribution 
of legal costs between parties in a 
trade secret case, such as Optic Graph-
ics. Id. at 587. In so doing, the court 
separated the trade secret misappro-
priation claim and the breach of the 
confidentiality agreement claim and 
decided that section 11-1204 applied 
only to the former. The court noted 
that section 11-1204 of the Act pro-
vides that a court may award attorney's 
fees if the opposing party makes a 
misappropriation claim in bad faith. 
Id. The court reviewed similar case 
law dealing with Maryland Rule of 
Procedure 1-341 regarding the impo-
sition of sanctions. The court posited 
that, in discouraging egregious behav-
ior by applying sanctions, a court 
should not be so harsh as to dissuade 
parties from asserting colorable claims. 
Id. at 589-90. The court emphasized 
that sanctions should not apply unless 
there is " clear evidence" that a party 
initiated or continued an action that 
was" entirely without color and taken 
for other improper purposes amount-
ing to bad faith." Optic Graphic, 591 
A.2d at 590 (quoting Needle v. White, 
568 A.2d 856, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1990)). 
In light of the court's earlier find-
ing that pricing and marketing infor-
mation is generally protectable as a 
trade secret, the court of special ap-
peals viewed the evidence as suggest-
ing that Optic may have had reason to 
believe its misappropriation claim was 
colorable. Optic Graphics, 591 A.2d 
at 590. The court, therefore, found 
that Optic was rightfully exercising its 
free access to the courts regardless of 
whether or not it could win its case, 
and that the trial court erred in relying 
solely on Agee's trial memoranda and 
application for sanctions to find that 
Optic initiated the claim in bad faith. 
Id. 
As for Optic's breach of contract 
claim regarding Agee's confidential-
ity agreement, the court affirmed the 
trial court's finding that Optic contin-
ued the suit in bad faith after learning 
of the forgery. ld. The court held that 
the evidence of both the forged signa-
ture on the agreement and Optic's 
awareness of the forgery on March 13, 
1990, may have carried the requisite 
weight for the trial court to find that 
Optic continued the suit in bad faith. 
The court remanded the case with the 
view that the fees and expenses from 
the misappropriation claim may be 
severable from those associated with 
the breach of contract claim, depend-
ing on what the trial court finds on 
remand. ld. at 590. 
The decision of the court of spe-
cial appeals in Optic Graphics offers 
the Maryland legal community some 
insight as to the direction lower courts 
may take in deciding disputes under 
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret 
Act. While courts must regard the 
Restatement of Torts as a guide in 
defining terms within the Act, they 
shall look specifically to the Act for 
settling such disputes. Furthermore, 
the Maryland legal community can 
expect courts to look to general provi-
sions under Maryland Rules ofProce-
dure and Maryland case law when 
sanctioning parties who bring bad 
faith trade secret misappropriation 
claims under the Maryland Uniform 
Trade Secret Act. As for the ambi-
tious employees who decide to branch 
off on their own from the powerful, 
more established employer, the court 
of special appeals has interpreted the 
Act to fully protect those daring souls 
and their former employers who act in 
good faith. 
- Michael E. Muldowney 
Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty Co.: 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF ASBES-
TOS-RELATED DISEASES UN-
DER A GENERAL LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE POLICY, "BODILY 
INJURY" OCCURS WHEN THE 
VICTIM IS INITIALLY EXPOSED 
TO THE HAZARDOUS CONDI-
TION. 
In Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty 
Co., 595 A.2d 469 (Md. 1991), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that, for the purposes of insurance The exposure, in his opinion, is the 
claims involving asbestos, "bodily direct cause of the diseases and, there-
injury" occurs when asbestos fibers fore, inhalation constitutes the point 
are inhaled and retained in the lungs, of" bodily injury." Mitchell, 595 
even if no diagnosable disease has A.2d at 471. 
manifested itself. If the period of Maryland Casualty disagreed with 
coverage has expired under a general Mitchell. It believed that because 
liability insurance policy for an in- Mitchell's policy coverage had lapsed, 
staller of asbestos products, claims for all asbestos-related disease claims 
diseases which are caused by exposure against Mitchell were no longer cov-
to asbestos fibers during the policy ered by Maryland Casualty. It felt that 
coverage will be defended by the in- unless the disease has manifested itself 
demnifier as if the resulting disease during the policy coverage, there was 
had manifested itself during the period no obligation to defend or indemnify. 
of coverage. In support, Maryland Casualty intro-
Until 1976, Lloyd E. Mitchell was duced the affidavit of Dr. Paul Epstein, 
involved in the sale, distribution and a clinician, which stated that exposure 
installation of products which con- to asbestos does not always result in 
tained asbestos. During the period of disease and that several events must 
1965 to at least January 1, 1977, occur in conjunction with asbestos 
Mitchell was covered by a general exposure before it can progress to 
liability insurance policy from Mary- bodily injury. Therefore, in his opin-
land Casualty Company.· The policy ion, diagnOSis of the disease would be 
required that Maryland Casualty de- the proper point at which to measure 
fend and indemnify Mitchell from all " bodily injury." ld. 
claims resulting from asbestos-related Both parties filed for declaratory 
bodily injuries which occurred during judgment in the Circuit Court for 
the insurance policy period. The HarfordCounty. Afterthecomplaints 
policy defined" occurrence" as "an were filed, each party also moved for 
accident, including continuous or re- summary judgment claiming that no 
peated exposure to conditions, which material facts were in dispute. The 
results in bodily injury ... neither trial court ruled in favor of Maryland 
expected nor intended from the stand- Casualty's motion, finding that the 
point of the insured." The policy point of" bodily injury," for the pur-
additionally defined "bodily injury" poses of insurance coverage, should 
as " bodily injury, sickness, or disease be measured by the point of manifes-
sustained by any person which occurs tation of the asbestos-related disease. 
during the policy period." Mitchell appealed, and the Court of 
After his insurance coverage had Appeals of Maryland granted certio-
lapsed, Mitchell was sued by several rari before consideration by the court 
individuals who had been exposed to of special appeals. 
asbestos in his products. He sought to The appellate court considered two 
have Maryland Casualty defend against issues. The first issue was whether, 
the claims, arguing that, because the under a comprehensive generalliabil-
people were injured from products ity insurance policy, coverage is trig-
installed during the period of cover- geredatthepointofinitial exposure or 
age, he should be defended and indem- when an asbestos-related disease first 
nified from those claims. In support manifests itself to a clinically detect-
of this contention, Mitchell introduced able degree. Second, the court con-
the affidavit of Dr. John Craighead, a sidered whether the circuit court erred 
physician and pathologist. It stated in adopting the " manifestation" theory 
that asbestos fibers injure the lungs infmdingforMarylandCasualtywhen, 
upon inhalation, and the resulting in- pathologically, damage to the body 
jury leads to a variety oflung diseases. from asbestos could occur upon expo-
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